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ABSTRACT. The purpose of this article is twofold: to analyze the impact of the information revolution on security and to clarify what existing international relations theory can say about this challenge. These pertinent questions are initially addressed by a critical review of past research. This review shows that the concern for security issues is largely confined to a specialist literature on information warfare and cyber-security, while neither the general literature on information society nor security studies pay any serious attention to information-technology-related security issues. The specialist literature is mostly policy oriented, and only very rarely informed by theory, whether from the international relations discipline or any other field. In this article, three general international relations "schools" (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) are scrutinized with regard to what they can say about security in the digital age. It is argued that the liberal focus on pluralism, interdependence, and globalization, the constructivist emphasis on language, symbols, and images (including "virtuality"), and some elements of realist strategic studies (on information warfare) contribute to an understanding of digital-age security. Finally, it is suggested that pragmatism might help to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and overcome the dualistic, contending nature of international relations theories.
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• Security • Theory Social scientists and experts on technology generally agree that states and societies the world over are becoming, for better or worse, increasingly dependent on information technologies. The development and interconnectedness of information and communications technologies (ICTs) such as the Internet, email, satellite television, and mobile phones are diffusing globally at an impressive speed. The Internet is undoubtedly the most striking example. From only a handful of websites in the early 1990s, the Internet grew to contain several million websites at the turn of the millennium. Moreover, the costs of producing, using, and communicating information have constantly decreased, making ICTs available to an increasing number of people all over the world (Choucri, 2000: 248-52; Nye, 2003 Nye, : 215-6, 2004a Nye, , 2004b . There is still a significant "digital gap," dividing the haves from the have-nots in terms of access and usage, a long-standing and welldocumented problem both within and between societies (Choucri, 2000; Hammond, 2001; Norris, 2001) . Notwithstanding persistent inequalities, the image is clear: the shrinking costs of ICTs have made them widespread and decentralized, reaching far beyond the political and economic elites of western societies. These observations apparently mark the limit of consensus among informed observers. The lack of consensus is particularly apparent when the basic question of the present article is addressed: what are the implications of the information revolution for national and international security? Some would argue that the state is still the main player in the field, maintaining (although adapting) its role as the supreme provider of security, even in cyberspace (Fountain, 2001) . Others claim that the emergence of "virtual states" and network economies imply a decline of interstate violence, and hence that security generally plays a significantly lesser role than in previous times. This truly optimistic perspective "sketches a future with an ever-widening zone of international peace" (Rosecrance, 1999: 24) . Still others hold that the information revolution has greatly increased the significance of firms, interest organizations, social movements, transnational networks, and individuals. In this vein, these non-state actors may be challengers to, as well as providers of, security (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Castells, 1998: 376; Henry and Peartree, 1998; Nye, 2003 Nye, , 2004a Nye, , 2004b . The general observation in this perspective, however, is that the information revolution makes security an increasingly important concern in all sectors of society.
In 1962, Arnold Wolfers wrote that national security is the absence of threat to a society's core values. If modern, economically developed countries are increasingly becoming "information societies," then, following Wolfers' argument, threats to information can be seen as threats to the core of these societies. The challenge of the information revolution for security and the state still remains unexplored, however, both in terms of policy and substantive issues. We argue that, in general, past research on this topic has been idiosyncratic and policy oriented, with little or no effort made to apply or develop theory. In particular, very few attempts have been made to apply international relations (IR) theory in analyzing the information revolution, an exercise which seems warranted both for the understanding of the impact of the information revolution on security and for the development of IR theory.
1 With this article, we intend to take a step toward filling this gap.
For most of its post-Second-World-War existence, the discipline of IR was quite content with itself. The development of IR theory strongly emphasized parsimony and universality, at the expense of empirical applicability (Wight, 2002) . It can be argued that empirical applicability requires a greater degree of complexity and contextually contingent thinking than has been provided by the dominant and more parsimonious IR theories (George and Bennet, 2005) . However, whether theories such as Kenneth Waltz's neorealism or Keohane and Nye's theory of complex interdependence actually gave an accurate understanding of real-world politics (that is, external validity) was considered either irrelevant or secondary to 222 International Political Science Review 27(3) claims of internal validity (Keohane and Nye, 1977: vi; Waltz, 1979: 6-7; Wight, 2002) . The first major sign of discomfort with this inward-looking obsession with theoretical consistency came with the end of the cold war (Allan and Goldmann, 1995; Lebow and Risse-Kappen, 1995) . The end of the cold war resulted in a major crisis not only for neorealism (reputedly, the most successful of IR theories), which had failed to predict and explain that turn of events, but also for IR in general. But although much has been written about the cold war's end and the associated need for redefining IR theory, particularly for increasing its external validity, surprisingly little has been written about the information revolution and what challenges this implies for IR theory.
We begin by reviewing three bodies of literature of ostensible relevance for understanding the impact of the information revolution for security: general theory and research on the emergence of the information society; the specific literature on information operations and cyber-security; and, lastly, security studies, a growing subfield of IR. Subsequently, three main IR perspectives are discussed in terms of what they nominally have to say about security in the digital age: realism, liberalism, and constructivism.
Past Research on the Digital Age and Security
When reviewing past research on the impact of the information revolution on security, the first observation is that the three bodies of literature which purport to have something to say about this have apparently not been informed by each other, although they deal with overlapping themes. Theory and research on the emergence of the global information society say very little about security, and, when they do, the focus lies primarily on the security of firms and markets rather than the security of states and societies. There is also a specific literature on war and terror in the digital age, which typically comes in the form of idiosyncratic policy analyses, but which does not communicate with the more general theory and research, and is very weak in terms of theoretical application and development.
The Digital-Age Literature and its Silence on the Security Issue
It is difficult to ascertain when the expression "information society" first appeared. In the early 1990s, many observers and journalists in the USA began to write and talk about the "information highway," especially after US President Bill Clinton's White House began popularizing the term. Almost accidentally (The Economist, 2002) , the Internet became the icon of the digital age, and particularly of "cyberspace," a term coined by novelist William Gibson (1984) .
Marxist sociologist Manuel Castells has been among the first and most influential prophets of the digital age. As early as the late 1980s, he noted that information had become the major primary resource of material productivity in the newly emerging "knowledge economy" (Castells, 1989) . Crucial services such as banking, air travel, water or energy distribution relied more and more on information technology (IT) to function. It was only a matter of time before information, in the 1990s, would become an indispensable cornerstone for modern, advanced societies. Castells (1996 Castells ( , 1997 Castells ( , 1998 Castells ( , 2000 dedicated a whole trilogy to the dawn of a global network society, pointing to the loss of sovereignty by nation-states and the emergence of alternative identities and communities. From Castells' perspective, transnational organized crime will become the greatest potential threat to global security.
Castells' view of the effect of changing information technologies is consistent with the work of IR scholars such as Hamid Mowlana. The study of the security dimension in Castells as well as in Mowlana, however, is limited to the impact of ICTs on organized crime (Castells, 1997 (Castells, , 1998 (Castells, , 2000 , military strategic communications, and the use of information as "propaganda" (Mowlana, 1997 ). Mowlana's work is empirically insightful, but weak in linking the information revolution to IR theory.
Political scientists have for a considerable time identified the ability to control information flows as a function necessary to preserve national sovereignty and boost national security (Agnew and Corbrige, 1995; Anderson, 1995; Krasner, 1995) . States have, however, faced multiple obstacles in this endeavor, as the development and availability of communication means have been a double-edged sword. In the past, one-to-many communication systems (that is, radio and television) allowed national governments to reach out to an entire citizenry with their own message, often with nationalistic rhetoric. Increasingly in recent years, however, professional media organizations (such as the BBC or CNN), human rights organizations, and individuals have all learned to take advantage of the same systems to distribute nongovernmental information, counterclaims, independent reports, and so on. This international flow of messages and images has grown at an extraordinarily rapid rate, thus saturating the capabilities of a state to monitor closely what information goes in and what goes out of its territory. Moreover, this traffic flows through increasingly integrated worldwide communication systems, which are no longer dominated by national bodies (Camilleri and Falk, 1992) .
As early as the 1970s, the new information technologies were thought to be likely to increase the vulnerability of states. A report to the Swedish government, the Tengelin Report (Tengelin, 1981) , emphasized the main risks of a networked society (including dependence on foreign vendors and the threat of hackers' raids). Currently, most governments are well aware that, through the Internet, individuals and groups from all over the world can communicate information over which a single government has little or no control. This information may affect the attitude of their citizenry vis-a-vis the political and economic structures of their countries. This is not a new phenomenon, since nation-states have had a similar experience with radio and television broadcasting. What is different is the magnitude of information and the multiple entry points that have further exhausted the capabilities of states and their resources to block the penetration of that information.
There are two factors that are peculiar to the global information society and are significant for appreciation of how ICTs have changed the concept of security. The first factor is the centrality of machines that communicate with each other and the psychological effects that this centrality implies. More than other machines in the past, the development of computers has resulted in optimistic visions of technical solutions to societal problems, or "technological fixes," as well as in feelings of fear (Volti, 1995) . Movies such as 2001: A Space Odyssey, War Games, The Terminator, and The Matrix are all sagas that depict "evil" computers taking over the world and are symptomatic of a culturally broad-based and profound fear of technological development. If the idea of depending on machines can be unnerving, knowing 224 International Political Science Review 27(3) that our well-being and safety is trusted to computers that may be required to make vital decisions is hard to bear. Thus, the psychological dimension of network society matters considerably. The most famous computer network, the Internet, has a distinctive characteristic: it is at the same time an infrastructure (that is, the actual computer network) and a communications medium.
2 On the same wires and with the same protocol, packets transport bytes that represent radically different information: an email to a friend, details on one's flight itinerary, online multiplayer gaming, statistics on a municipality's water consumption, or credit card numbers. With the exception of the last, which, like virtually all financial transactions, would be encrypted, most other communications are available in public, that is, anyone using the medium could read them.
When computer networks were proprietary, for example linking together a bank with its subsidiaries or US strategic command with nuclear missile silos, they were so expensive that only a very few organizations or institutions could afford them. Furthermore, they used protocols that authorized only their legitimate users to be in each network. Today, the Internet has opened up countless communication channels, reduced the cost of networking, and allowed human rights dissidents to spread their message. The Internet was designed to maximize simplicity of communication, not security of communication. The price for this has been the increasing opportunity for criminals or wrongdoers to exploit the vulnerabilities of the network for their own ends.
The Atheoretical Literature on Information Operations and Cyber-Terrorism
Whether hype or reality, cyber-threats have achieved an indisputable salience in post-cold-war security thinking, particularly among analysts and makers of defense and security policy. Critical infrastructure protection, information warfare, information operations, 3 information assurance, cyber-terrorism, Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), 4 and similar buzzwords are common currency in policy documents, defense bills, and security doctrines of the early 21st century. While conventional forces and military budgets have been generally downsized following the end of the cold war, the new emphasis on information security and cyber-threats are a noteworthy exception. In North America, Europe, Russia, China, and other parts of the world, governments are setting up new units and employing personnel for monitoring, analyzing, and countering the perceived risks and threats of the global network society.
The conception of cyber-threats has grown out of the fear of increased vulnerability and loss of control that presumably is the result of moving from an industrial to an information society (Alberts, 1996a (Alberts, , 1996b Alberts and Papp, 1997; Henry and Peartree, 1998; O'Day, 2004) . Without the development of global computer networks and communications, cyber-threats would be difficult to imagine except as science fiction. Notions of cyber-threats have originated in both the private and public sphere, among military as well as civilian actors. In the business community and within the police, cyber-crime has become a particularly salient threat image. Within the military-bureaucratic establishment, perceived threats have been framed as information warfare, information operations, cyberterrorism, and cyber-war. Among computer scientists, technicians, and network operators, threat images are usually much narrower, with an emphasis on computer network attacks, exploits, and disruptions (implying an adversary) and ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 225
on structural vulnerabilities such as software conflicts and other bugs which can lead to systems crashes (for example, the Year 2000 or "Y2K" computer bug).
Images of cyber-threats typically involve a very broad range of adversaries and targets, including both state and non-state actors (Campen et al., 1996; Erbschloe, 2001; Furnell, 2002; Henry and Peartree, 1998; Herd, 2000; Khalilzad et al., 1999; O'Day, 2004; Polikanov, 2001; Schwartau, 1996; Yourdon, 2002) . States are still typically seen as the single most important type of potential enemy, able to neutralize effectively the critical infrastructures of another country (for example, by shutting down telecommunications), but non-state actors are gaining attention as well.
A study by the National Research Council argues that "Tomorrow's terrorist may be able to do more with a keyboard than with a bomb" (Bendrath, 2001; Denning, 2001a: 282) . 5 Former US Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge (2002) observed that "Terrorists can sit at one computer connected to one network and can create world havoc -[they] don't necessarily need bombs or explosives to cripple a sector of the economy, or shutdown a power grid." Such rhetorical dramatization is characteristic of the entire discourse on information security and cyber-threats. The common view is that as societies and governments are becoming more reliable with respect to information technology, they are also becoming more vulnerable to all sorts of cyber-threats.
The most cataclysmic dramatization in the literature is that of an "electronic Pearl Harbor" (Bendrath, 2001; Everard, 2000; Forno, 2002; O'Day, 2004; Schwartau, 1997; Smith, 1998) . 6 According to the "electronic Pearl Harbor" scenario, phone systems could collapse, subway cars suddenly stop, and the money of thousands of people become inaccessible as banks and automatic teller machines stop functioning. In such an apocalyptic vision, overall critical infrastructures would be disrupted to the point that society and government would lose the ability to function normally. The evocative image of an "electronic Pearl Harbor" was immediately adopted in the US media and in certain circles of policymakers (Bendrath, 2003) . Former Deputy Defense Minister John Hamre argued that "We're facing the possibility of an electronic Pearl Harbor . . . There is going to be an electronic attack on this country some time in the future" (CNN, 1997).
Some commentators have argued that the "electronic Pearl Harbor" scenario is highly unlikely, and is more about fear-mongering than sober analysis. For example, Denning (2001b) argues that cyber-terrorism, defined as digital attacks causing physical destruction and human deaths, is extremely unlikely.
7 Few, if any, cyber-attacks could be characterized as acts of terrorism. Even the US Naval War College, in cooperation with the Gartner Group, concluded that an "electronic Pearl Harbor," although theoretically possible, was highly unlikely: "There are far simpler and less costly ways to attack critical infrastructure, from hoax phone calls to truck bombs and hijacked airliners" (The Economist, 2002: 19) .
Information operations are seen not merely as a means of improving or complementing physical attack, but as a means of replacing physical destruction with electronic (Denning, 1999; Harshberger and Ochmanek, 1999: 12; O'Day, 2004) . Denial-of-service attacks and the defacing of web pages certainly can have material consequences. For firms operating with online transactions, the result can be huge financial losses.
8 Nevertheless, the major impact is symbolic and the main effect is humiliation. To a large degree, cyber-attacks are attacks with and against symbols and images. Net-defacing, in particular, is a means for attacking symbols, something which is being done on an everyday basis by "hacktivists" on 226 International Political Science Review 27 (3) both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the China-Taiwan conflict, and the Protestant-Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland.
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Most observers focus on the transnational and network-based character of cyber-threats Ronfeldt, 1999, 2001; Deibert and Stein, 2003; Henry and Peartree, 1998; Keohane and Nye, 1998; O'Day, 2004; Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, 1997) .
10 Adversaries are typically seen as operating in loosely organized networks consisting of relatively independent nodes of individuals, groups, organizations, or even states, capable of quickly assembling and dispersing, even long before an attack has been discovered. In particular, network actors capable of using such means can resort to "asymmetric warfare" (Applegate, 2001; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; De Borchgrave et al., 2000; Erbschloe, 2001; Herd, 2000; O'Day, 2004; Sofear and Goodman, 2001 ). Although they might be incapable of engaging states in a conventional military conflict, they can inflict serious damage by attacking and exploiting the vulnerabilities of information systems by resorting to cyber-attacks Ronfeldt, 1999, 2001; Cordesman, 2002) .
The widely acknowledged framing of cyber-threats implies that boundaries are dissolved between the international and the domestic, between civil and military spheres, between the private and public, and between peace and war. If taken seriously, this framing suggests that not only the security of information systems is challenged, but also, and more fundamentally, the sovereignty of states (Everard, 2000; Fountain, 2001; Giacomello, 2005; Giacomello and Mendez, 2001; Rosecrance, 1999) . Cyber-threats challenge primarily internal sovereignty (effective control of the national territory and of the people living within it), but not necessarily external sovereignty (the formal recognition of independence by other states) (compare Philpott, 2001) . At stake are not only the tangible and intangible values of information, but also the ability of governments to control the course of events.
In conclusion, while there is a growing body of specialized literature dealing with the manifold aspects of digital-age security, there is also an alarmist tendency in this literature. Furthermore, this literature is policy oriented and hardly ever involves the application or development of theory.
Silence on the Information Revolution in Security Studies
A major issue in theoretically oriented security studies (a growing subfield of IR) is the very meaning of the essentially contested concept of security. Two contending positions can be discerned -those of traditionalists and those of wideners. Traditionalists hail typically from the realist camp and practice state-centric and military-oriented "strategic studies" (Ayoob, 1997; Walt, 1994) . They maintain that despite the emergence of ethnic and religious insurgence, global terrorism, transnational crime, and global warming, there is no need to broaden the definition of security. Allegedly for the sake of conceptual clarity and theoretical parsimony (Ayoob, 1997; Goldmann, 1999) , and arguably because of their underlying ideological priorities, traditionalists continue to approach security from the viewpoint of the nation-state and interstate war.
Wideners (who represent a mix of liberals and critical theorists) claim that the security concept should be broadened to encompass "new" threats and challenges, spanning political, societal, economic, and environmental sectors (Buzan, 1991; Buzan et al., 1998; Deibert, 1997; Müller, 2002; Stern, 1999) . In addition, wideners incorporate a range of "new" actors in their analyses, notably nongovernmental ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 227 organizations (NGOs), social movements, terrorist organizations, private firms, and individuals. The focus on the individual has spawned interest in "human security," which also has had an impact on United Nations policy.
Rather surprisingly in light of their broadened perspective, the wideners have only very rarely addressed the information revolution and its impact on security. Their expanded security concepts typically cover economic, ecological, political, and cultural issues, but seldom address the emergence of the Internet and other elements of the information revolution.
Some traditionalists have addressed the development of information technology, but only with regard to the technological improvement of military capabilities (Lonsdale, 1999) . Material capabilities have always played a crucial role in a statecentric and military-oriented perspective on national security (compare Knox and Murray, 2001; Van Creveld, 1991) . Intelligence gathering and psychological warfare (which are part of information operations) are also "material" capabilities and have always been important elements of warfare. Likewise, technological revolutions have always interested the military, from the invention of machine guns and airplanes to the development of radar and satellites. "Electronic warfare" has been an established concept and practice within the military for several decades. But for most traditionalists (and realists imprimis), information technologies are merely a new fancy add-on (compare Biddle, 2004; Everard, 2000: 109; Lonsdale, 1999) .
Regardless of the theoretical perspective advocated, there is obviously a gap to be filled in security studies: to address the impact of the information revolution for the general understanding of security in the contemporary world, as well as for explaining variation in security relations and policies across the world.
International Relations Theory and Security in the Digital Age
Realism, liberalism, and constructivism stand out as the main theoretical perspectives in contemporary IR. Although overlaps, linkages, and internal varieties are matters of discussion, they are generally perceived and portrayed as separate perspectives. Asking what each of these perspectives can nominally say about security in the digital age will clarify the potential relevance of each perspective, and may serve as a source of inspiration for further theory building and empirical research.
Realism
The core assumptions of realism are: (1) the state is the primary unit of analysis; (2) the state acts in a rational way to satisfy its national interests; and (3) power and security are the core values of the state. In all versions of realism, the worldview is essentially pessimistic. Anarchy (absence of central government) characterizes the international system, which forces states to act out of their national self-interest (survival). Anarchical conditions tragically lead to the "security dilemma." Power, measured primarily in terms of military capabilities and the associated striving for security, is the main driving force in world politics (Gilpin, 1986; Morgenthau, 1993; Schmidt, 2002) .
Kenneth Waltz attempted to turn realism into a scientific, systemic theory of international politics, with foreign and security policy beyond its scope. In so doing, he provided a universal and parsimonious explanation of how world 228 International Political Science Review 27(3) politics functions, but at the cost of downplaying the real-world relevance of his theory (Waltz, 1979: 5-7) . Mearsheimer, however, endeavors in his most recent book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001) , to fill the gap left by Waltz by laying the groundwork for a neorealist theory that is not only logically consistent, but also applicable to the study of foreign and security policy. In principle, realists do not see a need to revise their theories for understanding security in the digital age. The state is still seen as the main and sometimes only important actor. Moreover, a narrow (military) definition of security is maintained, thus denying that non-state actors may exercise any degree of (military) power. Realists would presumably tackle the challenge of the information revolution in much the same way as they have tackled previous challenges of transnationalization, complex interdependence, and globalization. These trends are seen as epiphenomena, which may very well affect the policies and domestic structures of states, but which do not undermine the anarchic system of international politics, and thus do not affect the primacy of the state as the supreme political unit.
Realists might consider IT-related security threats to be largely an economic issue, not necessarily affecting the security of states and not in themselves security threats. Indeed, there are some realists, or realist-inspired theorists, who generally defend a narrow, military definition of security, but who argue that if any widening of the concept should be made, it should be in order to include the economic dimension (Buzan, 1991; Walt, 1994) .
Some realists would likely consider information warfare as relevant, if defined as a new technological component in otherwise traditional interstate conflict (Lonsdale, 1999) . Psychological warfare has been a central element in military thinking at least since Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote his famous The Art of War some 2000 years ago.
11 Electronic warfare, such as the electronic jamming of radio communication, has been an element of interstate conflict for a much shorter time (since the Second World War), but is also a precursor of the much more recent talk of warfare in the digital age. The introduction of information warfare in strategic studies and military planning (which generally has been informed by realist thinking) could be seen as a marker of continuity rather than dramatic change. Some of the technology is new, as is the global capacity of resourceful digital adversaries, but the basic notions of attacking and defending information and information systems are as old as warfare itself -basically, old wine in new bottles.
Liberalism
Liberalism is a broad perspective which includes, inter alia, Wilsonian idealism and neoliberal theories (Moravcsik, 1998 (Moravcsik, , 1999 Walker, 1993) , democratic peace theory (Russett and Antholis, 1993) , interdependence theory Nye, 1977, 1989) , second-image theory (Gourevitch, 1978) , the bureaucratic politics approach (Allison and Zelikow, 1999) , and domestic politics approaches (RisseKappen, 1995; Snyder, 1991) . The most important contributions of liberal theory to the discipline of IR can thus be summarized as: (1) (particularly in the subfield of international political economy) by focusing on a broader set of issue areas than mere "Hobbesian" survival in an anarchic international environment.
13
Liberals agree with realists that states are central actors in world politics, but in contrast to realists, argue that states are by no means the only actors that play significant roles in international relations. Indeed, the most prominent change in recent years in the field of international politics has been the emergence of a wide range of new non-state international actors (transnational corporations, social movements, pressure groups, political party networks, migrants, and terrorists). Thus liberalism has the potential to show awareness of the emergence of new online groups, operating in chat rooms and "blogs," and through new types of audio-visual ICTs.
In most liberal readings of contemporary world politics, it is argued that the sovereignty of the nation-state is being permeated and fragmented by the development of transnational relations. Though a single transnational actor is seldom able to challenge the political, military, or economic power of a state, the increasingly complex and globally penetrating web of transnational relations perforates sovereign states to the extent that sovereignty is hardly more than a symbol of territorial integrity which, in reality, is no longer sustainable. Indeed, some liberals go as far as to claim that sovereignty is a burden rather than a power asset, as suggested by Rosenau's (1990) distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors.
14
The long-standing clash between realists and liberals in IR has, to some extent, overshadowed important similarities between the two. In particular, realism and liberalism share a rationalistic epistemological approach, including an emphasis on interest-based interaction (Buzan et al., 1998; Fearon and Wendt, 2002; Katzenstein et al., 1998; Schmidt, 2002) . This distinguishes realism and liberalism from constructivism, and even more so from other "interpretative" approaches such as post-structuralism and postmodernism. Liberalism, with its emphasis on non-state actors with transnational capacity and its insistence that the economy matters as much as security (the former is seen as the underlying element for the latter), broadens the definition of what international relations is about.
In general, liberalism tends to emphasize the positive outcomes of interdependence and interconnectedness, rather than the increasing vulnerability and insecurity that might ensue. There are two possible reasons for this "optimistic" tendency within liberalism. First, modern liberalism is influenced by Kantian and Wilsonian idealism (Duncan et al., 2003: 21-2, 32-4) . Emphasis is on the possibilities of overcoming conflicts by peaceful means, in particular, by norm and institution building at an international level. In contrast to realists, liberals believe that humans are, if not inherently "good," then at least morally receptive. Modernization, including technological development, is generally seen as a vehicle of enlightenment and peaceful change. Against this background, liberals have promoted notions such as collective security, and cooperative security, which, among others things, have influenced the United Nations, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.
Liberalism has also responded to realist state-centric and security-oriented theories of international relations by emphasizing the significance of non-state actors and "non-security" issues, such as trade and travel. Many liberals have actually taken a realist perspective of security for granted, and have taken a critical stance against addressing issues labeled "security" altogether. Consequently, the 230 International Political Science Review 27 (3) liberal critique of realist security thinking has prevented liberalism from developing its own perspective on security. This problem has not gone unnoticed. Some liberals have advocated a widened perspective, which, for example, includes economic, ecological, and human security concerns. Paradoxically, however, few liberals seem to have apprehended the challenge of the information revolution. Moreover, those that have are still silent on its implications for security. The influential theory of complex interdependence, initially developed in the 1970s by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, has recently been updated to meet the challenges of the digital age (Keohane and Nye, 1998; Nye, 2003 Nye, , 2004b . In this updated version, the costs of interdependence (sensitivity and vulnerability) are added as a new component to the theory. In addition, the impact of the information revolution on international relations is analyzed. It is, however, noteworthy that the costs of interdependence are framed merely in economic terms, and are not portrayed as matters of national or international security (Nye, 2003 (Nye, : 199-202, 2004b ).
Nye briefly observes that national security, defined as the absence of threat to major values, can be at stake. He does not, however, make any attempt to elaborate, critique, or place images of cyber-security threats within his own theoretical framework. Nye's influential concept of "soft power" is relevant for our topic nonetheless. Soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies . . . Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others" (Nye, 2004a: x, 5 ). Nye argues that soft power is becoming more important in the digital age than ever before, mainly because of the evolving multiple channels of global communication which easily transcend sovereign boundaries (Nye, 2004b : Ch. 7). Importantly, however, soft power is more about form than content. Soft power and the global ICTs that facilitate it are not simply instruments of cooperation, democratization, and peace, as Nye and other liberals would like to have it, but may just as easily be means of deception, propaganda, and terror.
If idealism and the fear of treading on realist ground by doing security analysis are removed, liberal theory implicitly provides insight into the nature of security in the digital age. In particular, it does so by paying due attention to the increasing plurality and significance of non-state actors, which are "sovereignty free," and to global complex interdependence, particularly its costs in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability. Two contemporary socioeconomic trends that are consistent with the dictum of liberal theory are important for our analysis: (1) the expanding partnership between the public and private sectors to provide services and (2) the merging of the civil and military spheres. Because of these trends, the distinctions in jurisdiction, competencies, duties, and risks that used to pertain to different segments of societies have become blurred.
Governments have increasingly recognized that they alone cannot provide the growing number of public services needed by modern societies. The trend toward public-private partnership and privatization evident in, among others, the health, education, and transportation sectors has even extended to national security. For example, in the USA, the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board of September 2002 relies on public-private partnership, conceding that "Government alone cannot secure cyberspace" (PCCIP, 2000: 5) . This might be seen as a "civilianization" of the military or, perhaps, a "militarization" of society. For instance, the recent "war on terrorism" is being waged with a mix of military and law enforcement approaches. The post-9/11 reform resulting in the new US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is yet another illustration. In a speech to the Electronics Industries Alliance, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge (2002) argued that the DHS indeed encouraged interoperability and cooperation at all levels.
The integration and complex interdependencies that follow from the information revolution are most apparent in the telecom sector. The military has always used civilian telecom networks to some extent, but, currently, the vast majority of military communication is transmitted through civilian networks and is indeed dependent upon them. Computer networks have become incorporated in the development of hard military power, but they have also become the mainstay of soft power (Fountain, 2001; Nye, 2002 Nye, , 2004a .
The question remains, nonetheless, whether a theory that was originally designed for analyzing actors and processes primarily in a political economy context can capture the impact of the information revolution on security. Is the development of global ICTs mainly a continuation and expansion of the transnationalization of society and economy which first began with trade and travel or is it something qualitatively different? Liberal analysts, including Nye, seem to suggest the former, but the question should remain open for further inquiry and critique. The inherent bias toward modernism and enlightenment tends to make liberals emphasize the positive rather than the negative aspects of complex interdependence and information technology. Cyber-threats and other challenges of the information revolution are clear and present elements of the more general trend of globalization, which arguably weakens the sovereignty and security of the state. Non-state actors are becoming even more numerous and powerful because of the information revolution. The emergence of the Internet not only made real-time global communications possible for existing NGOs, but also for new, exclusively online groups. This can obviously have both positive as well as negative effects: integration, cooperation, and liberation may be eased, but also terrorism, transnational crime, and the destabilization of states.
16
The liberal emphasis on a plurality of world actors is perhaps the most valuable contribution to theory building with regard to security in the digital age. This theme, however, is still underdeveloped. Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) are among the few scholars who not only adopt mainstream liberal notions of globalization and other challenges to state sovereignty, but also explicitly address the issue of actor plurality in the security problems of the digital age. They do so mainly by introducing and applying general network theory. Nevertheless, they do not make any explicit attempt to communicate with or contribute to theory. Although providing a theoretically informed analysis, their writing is most accessible to policy analysts and policy-makers, rather than to students of international relations.
Constructivism
In the late 1980s, social constructivism (or simply "constructivism") was explicitly introduced in the IR discipline. Since then, IR constructivism has expanded enormously, making a significant impact, in particular, on meta-theoretical debates, and increasingly on theory building and empirical research in IR. 17 The breakthrough for IR constructivism came partly from attacking the meta-
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International Political Science Review 27 (3) theoretical rationalism which is common to both realism and liberalism 18 and partly from providing substantive interpretations of those processes and factors downplayed by these theories. The end of the cold war implied a crisis for both realism and liberalism, as both perspectives failed to account for this paradigmatic change. This consequently opened a window of opportunity for constructivism. In terms of ontological and epistemological positioning, IR constructivists claim to have seized the "middle ground" between rationalism and postmodernism (Adler, 1997; Wight, 2002: 36) .
Constructivists emphasize the unavoidability of the interpretation (and thus distortion) of reality, especially with respect to the understanding of social and political activity. The ambition to uncover causal mechanisms and patterns is, notwithstanding, seen as entirely compatible with constructivism. Constructivists maintain that there is a material reality (for example, computers and cables) as well as a social reality (identities, interests, norms, and institutions), and that it is meaningful to distinguish between the two. The argument here is that, unlike material reality, social reality is socially constructed, and so is consequently always susceptible to change. Thus constructivists argue that social realities such as interests and identities can never be seen as static or be taken for granted, but should be seen as constantly produced and reproduced. Rather than asking what social realities are, IR constructivists ask how social realities become what they are (Adler, 2002; Wendt, 1992) .
Constructivists come in many forms and guises (modernist, critical, and pragmatic) and advocate a very wide range of methodologies and an even wider range of particular IR theories. Some constructivists focus entirely on states and the interstate system (Wendt, 1999) , while others study, for example, NGOs and transnational communities (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) and epistemic communities (Adler, 1992; Haas, 1990) . Adler (2002: 108, 110) has also suggested that constructivists should focus more on the individual. In terms of providing frameworks for understanding world politics, constructivism is clearly much more heterogeneous than realism and liberalism (Checkel, 1997; Fearon and Wendt, 2002: 56) .
If there is anything resembling a core constructivist theorem on what forces shape world politics or social reality in general, it goes something like this. At the most basic level, actors have a set of norms -beliefs about right and wrong. Norms shape identities -the separation of "we" from "them." In turn, identities shape interests. Importantly and in contrast to rationalism, all of these elements are seen as inherently dynamic. If interests change, it is because there is an underlying shift in identities and norms (Adler, 2002: 103-4; compare Ruggie, 1998) .
Social factors are seen not only as dynamic, but also as strongly conditional. Unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism does not aim for universal theory, but for conditional generalizations (Adler, 2002: 101) . Unlike postmodernists, however, constructivists do not resort to idiosyncratic narrations, but rather strive to uncover patterns of similarities and differences. What constructivism contributes is a pragmatic meta-theoretical stance on material as well as social reality, an emphasis on conditional generalizations, and a few guidelines as to what substantive IR theories should include and look at, especially the dynamic interplay between social factors such as norms, identities, interests, and institutions.
Constructivist security studies have contributed both with elaborations on the security concept and with more substantive analyses of security policy, as well as illuminating the relationship between security policy and national identity (Buzan et al., 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; Waever et al., 1993) .
When using a theoretical framework based in realism or liberalism, it is more or less prescribed as to what can or cannot be a security threat. In general, realists focus on violent actor-based threats (interstate war), while liberals tend to apply a wider perspective, including both non-state actors and structural threats (compare Sundelius, 1983) . Constructivism, on the other hand, does not take a general stance as to what can or cannot be framed as a security threat and how such threats can be dealt with. Constructivism focuses on the verb "become" rather than "can" or "cannot" (Adler, 2002: 95) . Nevertheless, constructivist security studies tend to emphasize identity and culturally related threats, particularly as these have been downplayed in realist and liberal accounts of security (Buzan et al., 1998) . The empirical openness of constructivism makes it possible to address the widest possible range of perceived security threats. In terms of threats to critical infrastructures, this could, for example, include not only digital attacks, but also technical collapses and bugs such as the infamous Y2K problem, as well as natural disasters such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions.
A noteworthy constructivist approach to security is the theory of "securitization," developed by the "Copenhagen school." This is about how, when, and with what consequences political actors frame something (anything) as a matter of security (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995; Williams, 2003) . The emphasis is on "speech acts" (that is, political language) and the implications this has for political agenda-setting and political relations. Securitization implies that an "existential threat" is identified, and that this "speech act" prioritizes the issue on the political agenda, legitimating extraordinary measures such as secrecy, the use of force, and the invasion of privacy. The Copenhagen school, while advocating a wide understanding of security, has not considered the information revolution at all. Eriksson (2001a Eriksson ( , 2001b , however, has studied the securitization of information technology in Swedish politics. His analysis shows the impact of different frames of IT-related threats on whom or what is blamed, and who is allocated responsibility for dealing with the problems. For instance, framing an incident as "cyber-crime" implies that criminals are to be blamed, and that the police are responsible for dealing with them. In contrast, the very same incident can also be framed as an instance of "information warfare," which implies that enemies to a given nationstate (other states or non-state actors) are to be blamed, and that the military has a responsibility to respond to the threat (Bendrath, 2001; Eriksson, 2001a Eriksson, , 2001b .
In the few additional constructivist accounts of digital-age security currently available, the emphasis is mainly on how information warfare challenges a multitude of boundaries, notably, boundaries of identity. Everard (2000) argues that information warfare is a particular kind of "identity warfare" in which all kinds of boundaries are challenged, including the classical domestic-international divide. Hence, the identity of the nation-state is at stake, although it may very well adapt, rather than succumb, to the constant penetration of formally sovereign boundaries and the emergence and articulation of new identities in cyberspace (compare Saco, 1999) .
The constructivist analysis of power and security in a virtual world implies emphasizing the significance of images and symbols in addition to the material reality of computers and cables. According to Der Derian (2000), one of many effects of war in the digital age is that it distances (some) actors from the bloody reality of war. This distancing is not about rendering geographical distance irrelevant (for example, the possibility of a hacker attacking a computer in Shanghai from a computer in Seattle, via a computer in St Petersburg). While not 234 International Political Science Review 27(3) discounting the significance of decreasing geographical distance, what we are rather referring to here is how virtuality affects the perception and conduct of war. Digital war is similar to computer games, to the extent that simulation is performed and perceived in the same way, that is, by using the mouse and keyboard of a computer. Virtuality thus blurs the boundary between the real and the imagined. It is no coincidence that the entertainment industry, including the film and computer-gaming industries with their effects and tactical tools and software, are also an increasingly important source of inspiration and expertise for the military (Der Derian, 2000; Everard, 2000) . The study of "symbolic politics" (the use and abuse of symbols for manipulating political discourse and public opinion) is highly relevant for studying digital-age security. The symbolic politics approach, first and foremost represented by Murray Edelman, is a constructivist contribution in social science, introduced long before the information revolution (Edelman, 1964 (Edelman, , 1977 (Edelman, , 1985 (Edelman, , 1988 Merelman, 1993; Sears, 1993; 't Hart, 1993) . One study has been conducted regarding the digital symbolic politics of US presidential campaigning (Klinenberg and Perrin, 2000) , yet the symbolic politics approach has not previously been applied in studies of digital-age security.
Defacing websites is a noteworthy practice of symbolic politics, less antagonistic than, but nonetheless comparable to, the burning of an enemy's flag. The cost of mending a website and securing a server are usually negligible in comparison with the cost in terms of lost confidence, disparagement, and feelings of vulnerability. Assaults and counterattacks against US and Chinese government websites by hackers from the respective countries have transpired. Similar digital wars are going on between Israeli and Arab hackers and between Pakistani and Indian ones. A symbolic politics approach shows how and why these actions are seen as an insult, an offense to national pride (or a corporate brand). The Internet could be seen as the vast new global arena for symbolic politics par excellence.
Constructivist analysis can, moreover, illustrate the function and impact of language in digital-age security. By making use of analogies to things familiar in the "real" or off-line world (comparisons to "bugs," "viruses," "worms," and "firewalls," for example), the abstract and technically complex world of cyber-security is made intelligible and indeed meaningful. The use of terms such as information "warfare" and "electronic Pearl Harbor" convey a special meaning: that which is digital by nature has, nonetheless, physical consequences comparable to those of conventional war. Constructivist analysis can contribute to revealing and understanding the significance of such rhetoric and symbolic actions.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to demonstrate the need to develop middlerange theories that integrate liberalism, constructivism, and realism for understanding the impact of the information revolution on security. The specialist literature on security in the digital age is policy oriented with little or no ambition to apply or contribute to theory, and IR scholars have, with few exceptions, paid only scant attention to the security problems of the digital age. In this conclusion, we seek to provide some initial guiding direction as to how this gap between theory and research can be bridged.
Liberalism and constructivism nominally seem to have more to say about our topic than is the case with realism. If stripped from its idealist and antirealist pre-ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 235 tensions, liberalism grasps many of the elements of security in the digital age: the multiplicity of non-state actors with transnational capacity, network economies, "vulnerability interdependence," and the consequent perforation of formally sovereign boundaries. Likewise, constructivism seems apt for analyzing the symbolic, rhetorical, and identity-based aspects of digital-age security. In general, realism tackles the challenge of the digital age as it has tackled other features of globalization -by largely ignoring it, or by subsuming information security to either political economy or domestic politics, none of which fit comfortably in the (neo)realist field of vision. There is, however, another possible application of (classical) realist thought in strategic studies in which information warfare is a key concept. In this perspective, information warfare is the technological continuation of classical forms of psychological warfare and, more recently, of electronic warfare. Yet even in this perspective, the analysis does not go beyond a military and state-centric orientation.
The foregoing analysis has shown that there are two interrelated problems in past efforts at understanding security in the digital age. First, theory and practice on this matter are so distant that they hardly ever inform each other. Second, existing IR theories are plagued by an entrenched dualism, implying great difficulties for theoretical adaptation and application in analyses of the complexities of the emerging new digital world.
One possible way of overcoming these problems is by adopting a more "pragmatic" approach. 19 While there are several strands of pragmatist philosophy, pragmatism generally advocates bridge building between theory and practice, methodological pluralism, contingent generalizations, and theoretical complementarities and tolerance rather than entrenched opposition (Bauer and Brighi, 2002: iii) . This seems to be exactly what is needed to bridge the gap between theory and practice, and to help overcome the dualistic conflicts in academic IR. There is thus no reason why the scholar trying to understand digital-age security cannot draw simultaneously on insights from a diverse range of IR theories, unfortunately often depicted as contending or incompatible, and on insights from the policy-oriented literature.
The critical reader might wonder whether "pragmatist" is another word for "empiricist" or, more cynically worded, for "not smart enough for theory" (Lewontin, 1992) . Indeed, pragmatism is more of an orientation, or ethos, than a theory. This is, however, a necessary first step to overcoming the chasm between theory and practice, and while a particular theory is not proffered, a fruitful starting point for the development of theory on security in the digital age is provided. With such a pragmatic approach applied to case studies and comparative analyses, it is possible to build a foundation upon which further theory building can be done, with an emphasis on middle-range theory and on conditional rather than universal generalizations. Henry and Peartree (1998) . 2. A possible point that might be raised by the reader here is whether this is not true for nearly all information technologies. Radio, television, telegraph, and even books and newspapers are, after all, both infrastructure and medium. This possible criticism misses the point, however. With the Internet information about the status of the network, about financial transactions, and about the functioning of other utilities travels on computer networks along with emails to friends and relatives or messages in "intimate" chat groups. This is not the case with radio or television. Data on the functioning and management of a television or radio network does not travel "in clear" (that is, unencrypted) on the same wavelength along with the morning news or weather forecast. 3. The US Department of Defense has rechristened information warfare (IW) as information operations (IO). NATO has also adopted the same definition. IO are "actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems" (Department of Defense, 1998: vii) . Hence, IO is a broad concept that includes physical means (for example, a precision bomb or a hammer) as well as digital means (a virus or a "hoax") to fulfill that objective. If the tools used are digital, then the operation falls into the subclass of Computer Networks Operations (CNO). CNO are further divided into Computer Networks Exploitation (CNE), Computer Networks Attacks (CNA), and Computer Networks Defense (CND). CNO are also divided into nonlethal and lethal CNO. The former group is much larger and comprises the most diverse actions, ranging from propaganda and perception management to psychological operations (psychops), denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on commercial websites, web defacement, espionage, and cyber-crime. The goal is to control, disrupt, alter, or deny use of information, more than to cause damage or kill people. The latter class of CNO aims at destruction or disruption of information infrastructures to provoke economic damage or even casualties. 4. RMA, which depicts a technologically driven change in military strategy, has received considerable scholarly attention both within and beyond the military. Like most other work on information security and technology, however, the RMA literature is distinctively empiricist (see Goldman, 2005; Goldman and Mahnken, 2004; Gongora and Von Riekhoff, 2000; Laird, 1999; Matthews and Tredderick, 2001; Sloan, 2002) . 5. See also the following statement by US Senator John Edwards (2002) : "We live in a world where a terrorist can do as much damage with a keyboard and a modem as with a gun or a bomb." 6. This is a metaphor that has been circulating among so-called "infowarriors" since the mid-1990s, reportedly coined by Winn Schwartau, the creator of www.infowar.com. 7. Libicki (1997: 38) hoists a warning against equating the destruction of bits and bytes with the bloodshed of conventional war and terrorism. To some extent, the edited volume by Robert Latham (2003) inadvertently suggests that type of association. 8. For instance, in 1994, the Russian hacker "Vladimir Lenin" illegally transferred $10 million from the American Citibank (Cordesman, 2002; Freedman, 2000; PBS Online, 2002) . 9. On this point, see, for example, Denning (2001a Denning ( , 2001b , DSBTF (2001: ES-4), and Fsecure (2003) . 10. This is illustrated by well-known incidents of cyber-attacks. In 1998, three young hackers successfully intruded upon hundreds of computer systems with sensitive US armed forces information. The incident, subsequently dubbed "Solar Sunrise," initially provoked fear of a possible information attack by a "hostile nation," supposedly Iraq. Two of the young hackers turned out to be located in California and the third in Israel (Bendrath, 2001; Cordesman, 2002: 40; DSBTF, 2001 : 2). 11. According to several scholars (Kaldor, 1999; Keegan, 1993; Van Creveld, 1991) , contemporary wars have rendered Clausewitz obsolete. War as a rational instrument of a state's foreign policy is too limited a concept. Sun Tzu (1963) with his emphasis on ERIKSSON/GIACOMELLO: The Information Revolution 237 surprise, deception, attacking weak points, and "unlimited war" seems to be the theorist of modern times. Clausewitz (a romantic, dialectic, and complicated European) was much more articulate than many readers might imagine, however. His point was that war is policy as well as politics. There is no distinction between politics and war; they are part of the same game. Clausewitz's conclusion is much more apt for modern network societies than many might expect. As societies grow more and more dependent on computer networks, they also increase their vulnerability. The artificial distinction between politics and war (or peace and war) that Clausewitz warned against acquires new meaning in the digital age. 12. There are a few liberal analyses of regime building and institutionalization concerning the Internet and other elements of the digital age. Some concern mainly non-security issues (Franda, 2001; Rosenau and Singh, 2002) , but Valeri (2000) and Giacomello (2005) are exceptions. 13. For an overview of IR liberalism, see, for example, Duncan et al. (2003: 29, 32-4) . 14. On this point, see also Nye (1977, 1989) and Camilleri and Falk (1992) . 15. Liberals would acknowledge that "sovereignty-free" actors include, for example, not only General Motors, the International Monetary Fund, and Amnesty International, but also al-Qaeda, the Irish Republican Army, and the Cosa Nostra. 16. An anathema for liberalism is the contagious fear that democratically elected decisionmakers cannot provide domestic security, let alone guard state and society against transnational threats. With his theory of "risk society," German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1992 Beck ( , 1999 ) provides a fundamental critique of liberal, utopian visions of modernization. In Beck's analysis, the development of and increasing reliance on modern technologies, such as nuclear power, has the effect of constantly producing new risks. In this perspective, the focus is on the side effects of new technologies for communication, energy production, and commerce. In particular, Beck emphasizes the ecological risks of living with new technologies. Beck is, however, strikingly quiet on the risks of new ICTs in general, and on cyber-threats in particular. 17. Onuf (1989) and Wendt (1992) are generally acknowledged as two of the original constructivists in contemporary IR theory. For a useful overview of how IR constructivism has developed since then, see Adler (2002) . 18. Some scholars claim that the gap between rationalism and constructivism is exaggerated and that it can and should be bridged (Checkel, 1997; Katzenstein et al., 1998) . This controversial argument presupposes, however, that a division of labor is made between explaining instrumental action (rationalism) based on interests and explaining the norms and identities which shape interests and thus action (constructivism). Adler (2002: 108-9) considers this a way of subsuming constructivism under rationalism, a way of seeing constructivism as merely a background theory of an otherwise rationalistic approach. 19. Pragmatism is a philosophical orientation developed mainly by American thinkers such as Charles Sanders Peirce (1963) and John Dewey (1948 
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